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This document is not an official publication of the Inter-American Development Bank. The purpose of the 
Economic and Social Study Series is to provide a mechanism for discussion of selected analytical works related to 
the development of the country members of the Regional Operations Department I. The opinions and conclusions 
contained in this document are exclusively those of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies and 
opinions of the Bank’s management, the member countries, or the institutions with which the authors are 
affiliated.   I. Introduction 
This paper provides an overview of the most salient features of the Latin American growth performance 
during the last four decades. The analysis sheds light on the strengths and weaknesses of long-run growth of 
Latin America by identifying similarities and differences with other regions and assesses their economic 
performance on that comparative basis. 
 
During the past four decades, many countries in Latin America went through several episodes of economic 
crises, political instability and social unrest. In the same period, they also experienced episodes of economic 
stabilization, political reorganization and structural reforms. A cursory look at some basic development 
indicators suggests a positive net result (see table 1). Generally speaking, income per capita increased and 
health and education indicators improved, while the underlying economic structure turned more integrated to 
global trade and there were improvements in institutional quality and macroeconomic management (as 
measured by an index of quality of institutions and inflation, respectively). However, how satisfactory are 
these achievements?  
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Latin America 1590 2000 2050 2170 56 61 65 68 3.1 3.8 4.7 5.4
Rest of the World 2380 3350 4100 4810 58 61 65 67 3.3 4.3 5.3 6.3
Developed 13420 18860 23160 27790 71 73 75 77 7.1 7.8 8.7 9.4
East Asia 1860 3360 5590 9480 60 65 70 73 4.5 5.3 6.5 7.6
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Latin America 37 44 48 57 11 30 240 164* na na -1.3 -0.2
Rest of the World 55 67 72 78 4 11 14 10 na na 1.0 1.6
Developed 47 55 61 64 4 10 10 7 na na 3.0 3.4
East Asia 112 131 166 193 4 9 5 5 na na 1.2 2.0
Sources: Penn World Tables, World Development Indicatiors (WB), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).
* In the second half of the 1990s the average inflation rate was equal to 15%
** First principal component of ICRG variables: rule of law, corruption, bureaucratic quality, risk of expropriation and risk of repudiation of contracts
Trade volume             
(% of GDP)
Annual inflation             
(%)
Index of institutional quality **
Table 1: Basic Indicators (averages over decades)
Real GDP per capita in 2000 
dollars
Life expectancy at birth,      
total years 
Years of education in pop of 
age 15 and higher
 
In order to analyze how satisfactory the growth process in Latin America has been over the past 40 years it is 
important to make relevant comparisons with other experiences. To tackle this issue, we focus on the per-
capita economic growth rate and its contributing factors, comparing the experience of the typical country in 
Latin America (LAC) with that of benchmark countries, namely a typical country of the rest of the world 
(ROW) and of its subsets of developed countries (DEV) and East Asian countries (EASIA). 
 
We find that, in the period 1960-99, the typical Latin American country experienced a slower growth rate 
than that of the typical rest of the world country, and in particular of the typical developed country, thus 
  2producing a widening of the income-per-capita gap between Latin America and the developed world. The 
key to these differences is productivity, not factor accumulation. It is slower productivity growth what 
accounts for the slower growth of Latin America relative to the other regions. We provide some econometric 
evidence suggesting that the worse institutional quality of Latin America relative to rest of the world, and to 
a lesser extent, the lower degree of openness and the higher degree of macroeconomic instability, were 
important factors behind these differences in productivity growth. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the economic performance of Latin 
America during the last four decades and compares it with the experience of the benchmark countries. 
Section III conducts accounting exercises in order to examine the contributions of various factors to the 
differences in performance observed in Section II. Section IV develops an econometric model to explore the 
role of policy and institutional variables as drivers of these contributions. Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
II. Performance 
In order to compare the Latin American countries with other benchmarks we use a sample of 73 countries
2, 
of which 20 are from Latin America and 53 from the rest of the world (20 of them belong to developed 
countries and 5 to East Asia). In constructing the benchmarks, we use simple (un-weighted) averages across 
countries in the control group to account for the growth experience of the typical country in it. A detailed list 
of the country groupings is shown in Appendix A. Our summary measure of economic performance is the 
growth rate of real (PPP-adjusted) GDP per capita. The data is taken from the Penn World Table 5.6 and 
supplemented by other sources described in Appendix A.   
 
Figure 1 presents the annual growth rate of GDP per capita for the typical Latin American country during the 
last four decades. Overall, Latin American countries made progress during the period 1960-1999 despite 
shrinking during the eighties, the lost decade. The average growth rate of GDP per capita during the nineties, 
however, was slower than during the sixties and seventies. It does not come as a surprise then that the sixties 









                                                 
2 Maximum set for which complete information was available. 
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1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960-99
 
Comparing absolute growth rates across decades, however, is somewhat misleading. If one considers the 
performance of Latin America relative to other regions the story is quite different. This is shown in figure 2. 
Throughout the four decades, Latin America was consistently outperformed by the rest of the world and 
other relevant comparators, so that it lost ground in the world. Contrary to the message in figure 1, the 
relative performance of the region was poorer during the sixties and seventies than during the nineties. 
Therefore, it follows that the “golden decades” were also golden for the rest of the world, not an indication of 
Latin American virtue in these times.
3 This confirms the finding in Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (2001) who 
used this differential approach to measuring the growth effect of the reforms of the early 1990s.   
 
Although Latin America performed relatively better during the nineties, its average growth rate was still 
below that of the rest of the world. In that sense the nineties were no different from the other decades as the 
region continued to experience a relative regress. Accordingly, the income per capita relative to comparators 









                                                 
3 It is worth noting that if the comparison is done using weighted averages, the golden decades would still look better than the 
nineties. However, as pointed out by De Gregorio and Lee (this volume), this is a misperception that some analysts have incurred, 
since the weighted results likely reflects mostly the strong performance of Brazil and Mexico during this time. An appropriate 
comparison should use un-weighted averages in order to account for the growth experience of the “typical nation”. 










1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1960-99
Rest of the World Developed East Asia
Difference in GDP per capita annual growth between 




Rest of the World 87% 59%
Developed 31% 20%
East Asia 128% 31%
Based on real GDP per capita (PPP)
Table 2: Latin America Income Per Capita (%)




Beyond averages, the swings in the per capita growth rates across decades are indications that growth 
performance was unstable in Latin America. Low persistence of country growth performance is a well 
known fact established by Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) as a general feature in the world 
over a similar period (and historically). Using our sample, we find that for Latin American countries are 
especially unstable. Their correlation coefficient of growth per worker between the first two decades (1960-
79) and the last two (1980-99) is 0.26 lower than a respectable correlation of 0.45 for our full sample of 73 
countries.
4  
                                                 
4 These relatively high correlation coefficients significantly differ from the uncorrelation found by Easterly and Levine (2001) over a 
similar period for a larger sample of countries. Our analysis with our sample reveals that their uncorrelation result changes 
significantly when periods are updated and is also dependent on including countries we chose to discard from our sample because of 
low informational value. 
  5III. Accounting for Performance 
In this section we perform growth and level accounting exercises based on a Cobb-Douglas production 
function to identify the proximate causes of growth performance. Let Y represent domestic output, K physical 
capital, L labor force, h the average quality of the labor force (scaled in such a way that hL measures human 
capital in units of unskilled labor), and A total factor productivity or TFP (that is the combined productivity 
of physical and human capital)
5: 
 
(1)     A L h K Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
−α α 1 ) (
 
The production function can be written in terms of number of workers as follows: 
 















In order to account for the growth rate in per capita terms, we can express (2) in terms of the entire 
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to express (2) in income per capita terms: 
 

















In terms of growth rates this is expressed as follows:  
(5)    
∧ ∧
∧ ∧ ∧






















) 1 ( α α  
 
The output and population data are taken from the Penn World Table 5.6. The capital stock series are taken 
from Easterly and Levine (2001), which is consistent with Penn World Table 5.6. The labor input is 
measured by the labor force. This data is taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
  6(Alternatively, factor inputs could be measured only to the extent to which they are actually utilized in 
production, i.e. labor input could be measured by employment, excluding the unemployed, and capital input 
could be measured according to its actual utilization rate. Appendix B describes how this alternative choice 
of measurement would amount to a more narrow definition of productivity and shows that the use of 
employment as labor input would not qualitatively change the interpretation of our findings).  
 
We follow Hall and Jones (1999) and consider h to be relative efficiency of a unit of labor with E years of 
schooling.  Specifically, the function takes the form: 
 
(6)    
) (E e h
φ =
 
where the derivative ) ( ' E φ is the return to schooling estimated in a Mincerian wage regression. We take Hall 
and Jones approach and assume the following rates of return for all the countries: 13.4% for the first four 
years, 10.1% for the next four years, and 6.8% for education beyond the eighth year.  Average quality of the 
labor force h results from applying (6) to the average years of schooling of the labor force.  Finally, we 
consider a capital income share α  of 1/3. Sensitivity analysis, however, showed no qualitative differences in 
the results when we use capital shares of 0.4 or 0.5.  
 
The contributions of the various components in (5) to account for the overall effects on income per capita 
Y/P help identify the proximate drivers of growth. The first component, L/P, measures the labor participation 
rate, i.e. the labor force as a proportion of total population.
6  The second component refers to capital intensity 
K/L and measures the effect of physical capital accumulation.  The third component refers to labor skills h 
and measures the effect of human capital accumulation.  The combined effect of these three components can 
be interpreted as the effect of factor accumulation, respectively of labor force size, physical capital intensity, 
and skill level of the labor force.  Finally, the last component A is obtained as a residual once the effect of the 
rest of the observable variables on to income per capita Y/P,  that is the effect of factor accumulation, is 
accounted for.  This last component thus measures the effect of total factor productivity or TFP. 
 
TFP turns out to be key to explain some of the observed trends in the evolution  of income per capita, so it is 
important to be precise about how to interpret our estimations of it.  Evidently, our measure of TFP in part 
reflects technology available.  However, this is not the interesting aspect of the interpretation of this measure 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5 In this specification, total factor productivity excludes the effect of changes to the skill level of the labor force, which is captured by 
h and accounted as factor accumulation of human capital. 
6 A more detailed analysis can decompose this component into a demographic factor, dealing with the fraction of the population of 
working age, and a behavioral factor concerning their participation rate in the labor force (i.e., the fraction of the able who are willing 
to work). 
  7because our main findings are based on gaps resulting from comparisons across countries, which in principle 
could benefit equally from technological progress, thus rendering no effect on these gaps. Apart from 
technology, our measure of TFP also incorporates the degree to which available factors of production, both 
physical and human capital, are utilized.  This is so because we chose to account for all available production 
factors, i.e. including unutilized physical capital and unemployed labor, so that any waste in these resources 
available to market forces due to non-utilization gets reflected into a lower TFP.  The use of this more 
encompassing measure of TFP is very important to explain cyclical variations driven by factor utilization 
rates, but once again is unimportant in the long run (see Appendix B).  In the long-run our preferred 
interpretation of TFP to explain gaps between countries, especially changes in these gaps, is that of 
distortions in the workings of the economy that drive aggregate efficiency below the technological frontier 
even if each firm is technologically efficient at the micro level (see Parente and Prescott, 2002). 
 
As expected, in all regions TFP explains a large portion of the annual variability of GDP per capita (Easterly 
and Levine, 2001). For the case of the typical Latin American country, the contribution of TFP even exceeds 
100% which implies that TFP was more volatile than output. As reported by De Gregorio and Lee (this 
volume), this is also true for many Latin American countries individually. However, although TFP is the 
dominant driver underlying the variability of the annual growth rate in Latin America, its importance is 
minor for explaining long run growth rates. As shown in figure 3, factor accumulation (resulting from labor 
participation rates,  worker’s skills and physical capital intensity) is the main driver explaining progress in 
the region during the 1960-99 period.  
 
When we consider the contributions of productivity by decades, however, the results are mixed: it was a 
dominant positive factor  in the sixties, a dominant negative factor in the eighties and was negligible in the 
seventies and nineties (see figure 4). A negative contribution of TFP in a whole decade, like in the eighties, is 
hard to explain as a technology reversal. In Appendix B we argue that our measure of productivity is 
associated with a broad definition of efficiency because it also captures changes in input utilization. Figure 
B.1 shows, however, that the reductions in the utilization of labor account only for a very small part of the 
fall in productivity during the eighties. Still a very large portion of the decline in productivity remains 
unexplained. As we argued before, a more plausible alternative is to consider a rise in the level of distortions 
which would hinder the level of efficiency with which the economy operates. This decrease in aggregate 
efficiency goes directly into the productivity measure because it is calculated as a residual from the aggregate 











TFP growth in Latin America




























Labor/Pop Skills Capital/Lab TFP
Growth Accounting 
average annual growth rates (1960-1999)
 
 
The next step is to pursue our comparative approach and use these growth accounting exercises to examine 
the factors underlying the slower growth of Latin America relative to the benchmarks during the 1960-99 
period. This is shown in table 4. The lack of TFP growth is very important to account for the slower growth 
of the region relative to the comparators. In fact, it is the dominant factor to account for the growth gap over 
  9this period.
7 It is worth noting that the results in table 4 hold true consistently across decades (see table 5). 
The only exceptions are when we compare Latin America with the developed countries in the 1960s and the 
East Asian countries in the 1990s, in which slower capital accumulation is the key factor to account for the 
growth gap. 
GDP per-capita 
Growth Labor/Pop Skills Capital/Lab TFP
Rest of the World -1.25% 0.19% -0.01% -0.35% -1.07%
Developed -1.38% 0.02% 0.14% -0.38% -1.16%
East Asia -4.19% -0.33% -0.13% -1.62% -2.11%
Table 4: Difference in growth contributions between Latin America and comparator 
average annual growth rates (1960-99)
GDP per-capita 
Growth Labor/Pop Skills Capital/Lab TFP
Rest of the World -1.29% -0.10% -0.07% -0.54% -0.58%
Developed -1.63% -0.34% 0.01% -0.91% -0.38%
East Asia -2.82% -0.49% -0.20% -0.96% -1.17%
Rest of the World -0.89% 0.04% 0.06% -0.22% -0.78%
Developed -0.50% -0.20% 0.22% 0.01% -0.52%
East Asia -4.81% -1.02% -0.15% -1.36% -2.27%
Rest of the World -2.21% 0.40% 0.10% -0.56% -2.15%
Developed -2.85% 0.12% 0.23% -0.45% -2.74%
East Asia -5.71% -0.07% 0.02% -1.95% -3.72%
Rest of the World -0.50% 0.38% -0.03% -0.11% -0.74%
Developed -0.58% 0.46% 0.11% -0.23% -0.91%
East Asia -3.15% 0.26% -0.09% -2.14% -1.18%
1980s
1990s
Table 5: Difference in growth contributions between Latin America and comparator by decades
1960s
1970s
average annual growth rates (1960-99)
 
 
The finding that TFP is the dominant factor to account for the growth gap between Latin America and other 
comparators also applies quite uniformly to each of the countries of the region. Figure 5 shows the 
differences in the growth contributions between each country in Latin America and the Developed countries 
during the period 1960-99. According to the figure, many of the growth differences in labor participation and 
in skills are, in fact, positive. Negative differences, on the other hand, are very common in the growth rate of 
capital accumulation. However, the largest negative differences are seen in TFP growth. This is true for all 
                                                 
7 Sensibility analysis with a capital share of 0.4 shows that the slow growth of Latin America’s total factor productivity is still the 
dominant factor to account for the growth gap relative to all the regions except with respect to East Asia. With this region, lack of 
capital accumulation becomes the most important factor to account for the growth gap during the 1960-99 period.  
  10the countries of the sample (except for Bolivia in which the largest difference is in capital accumulation). 
Similar results arise when using the other benchmarks. 
 
Figure 5 
Differences in growth contributions with developed countries 







































































































































































































































































































Results so far have shown that the slower growth rate of Latin America relative to the benchmarks is mainly 
the result of the slower TFP growth in the region. This however, does not tell us anything about the size of 
the income gap. In order to explore how far behind is Latin America relative to the other regions in terms of 
each of the resource factors contributing to income, we perform level accounting exercises. To facilitate the 
exposition, we leave aside differences in labor participation and perform level accounting exercises with 
respect to income per worker. The exercises are based on the following equation: 
 
(7)  
























where y is real GDP per worker and k is capital per worker. Variables with an asterisk refer to the typical 
Developed country from the sample and variables without asterisk refer to the typical Latin American 
country. 
 
  11The results are presented in figure 6. The first column is the income per worker in Latin America during the 
1960s relative to that of the developed countries. We see that worker productivity in Latin America was 37% 
of that in developed countries. The next three columns represent the relative level of the contribution of each 
factor. The shortfalls in each one of these three contributions combine to produce that result. Following (7), 
the product of these three columns is equal to the value of the relative income per worker given in the first 
column (0.37 = 0.76 x 0.58 x 0.84). In the right-hand side of the figure the exercise is repeated for the 1990s. 
In both cases, lower capital/labor ratios are the main cause of lower incomes. 
 
Latin America experienced a decline in relative income per worker from 37% to 24% between the three 
decades. In that period, the gap in TFP experienced a large opening: TFP in Latin America was around 84% 
of the TFP in the Developed countries during the 1960s, a small shortfall, and it went to 58% during the 
1990s. This confirms that the collapse in relative TFP of about 30% is behind the similar decline in relative 
income. In fact, the other two growth contributions largely offset each other: labor skills made some 
marginal progress (from 76% to 80%) but physical capital intensity regressed further (from 58% to 53%). 
 
Figure 6 


































What can we make of these shortfalls and their trends? One insight is that the skills of the labor force is not 
the key to Latin America’s (relatively) low and deteriorating income. In fact, if the skills of the labor force 
were the only difference with developed countries, income-per-worker would be as high as 80% (that is 
similar to the level of Spain) and getting better over time. Notwithstanding the benefits of policies aimed at 
  12improving the skills of the labor force to increase average income
8, the key to Latin America’s dismal and 
worsening relative income of about one fourth of that of developed countries is to be found in physical 
capital and total factor productivity.   
 
A second insight is that physical capital intensity in Latin America, low and declining as it is relative to that 
in developed countries, is not following an anomalous path but, rather, it is evolving as it would be expected 
in capitalist economies driven by profit. Investment, and a fortiori the stock of physical capital, is determined 
by the existence of profitable opportunities in the economy as measured by marginal returns to investment, r 












= ⋅ α  
 







⋅ = δ  ,     where 
* r
r
= δ    
 
Figure 6 implies that in the 1960s, δ  was around 1.9 and in the 1990s it was around 1.7.  One standard 
interpretation of δ , the gap between rates of return to physical investment, is that it measures the degree of 
financial integration of Latin America (δ =1 would mean perfect integration; the higher δ  the less 
integrated, so that excess returns in Latin America would be left unexploited).
9 Under this interpretation, 
better financial integration to the point of perfection could improve relative income only to 31%, still below 
than what it was back in the 1960s (this is also roughly similar to the improvement of income that would take 
place from a total elimination of the skill gap). Alternatively, δ may reflect other costs associated with 
investment, such as taxation or risk of expropriation, or a risk premium due to uncertainty. In that case the 
policies to produce higher capital intensity lie elsewhere. 
 
Once again, the analysis reveals that the gap in total factor productivity is the key to understanding low and 
declining relative incomes in Latin America. First, it should be noted that if Latin America were to increase 
                                                 
8 And also to alleviate poverty and social inequities when focalized in the disadvantaged, an issue outside this study. 
9 In this formulation, r and r* refer to gross returns, inclusive of depreciation. Another interpretation for δ  is that it reflects different 
depreciation patterns in investment in both types of economies. 
  13its total factor productivity to the level of developed countries, with the same physical and human capital 
resources that is has in place now, relative income would significantly improve by 18 percentage points, to 
42%. And second, and equally important, impressive as these measures of the significance of TFP gaps are, 
they severely underestimate the impact of the TFP shortfall. In fact, the handicap in TFP has equally 
important indirect effects on lower incomes because it is low productivity what underlies low stock of 
physical capital (and to some extent human capital) by reducing the returns to investment. A conservative 
estimation of the indirect effects of closing the TFP gap, leaving aside any effects on the incentives for 
human capital accumulation and on the rate of return gap δ , yields an estimated increase in relative income-
per-worker of additional 17 percentage points through the increase of the equilibrium physical capital stock 
in (9). 
 
The overall conservative estimation of the effect of closing the TFP gap would improve the relative income-
per-worker of the typical Latin American country by 35 percentage point to 59%, a level above that in 
Portugal or Greece. It is therefore essential to analyze the factors that underlie TFP performance and the 
policies that may be employed to increase it, a research agenda to which we will return in section IV. 
 
Another approach to learn from figure 6 about the nature of the shortfalls is to look at their relative 
imbalances with respect to a benchmark of normal economic development, which may reveal important 
features of the growth performance in Latin America.  In what follows we utilize a prediction model for the 
variables in figure 6, that is the relative gaps with respect to developed countries, controlling for the level of 
development of countries as measured by income per capita on the basis of world cross-country experience 
in each period. We then apply this model to Latin American income levels to construct a benchmark of 
normal development and contrast it with the actual performance shown in figure 6 (see figure 7). 
 
The fact that Latin America exhibits gaps (in figure 6) in all the contributing factors is perhaps not surprising 
given the lower level of development in the region. An interesting question, however, is whether the size of 
these gaps are consistent with the levels of income observed in Latin America. This is presented in figure 7, 
where the bars indicate again the observed relative levels of the contributing factors and the dots indicate 
these same relative levels adjusted by the level of development.
10 During the 1960s, the relative level of TFP 
in Latin America was above the level that the region should have had according to its development stage. 
The opposite was true with respect to skills and physical capital. These imbalances disappeared by the 1990s. 
By then, the relative levels of these contributing factors were more in tune with the levels of development of 
                                                 
10 For this, we regressed the log of each contributing factor on the log of income per worker using the entire sample of countries 
excluding the Latin American countries in each decade. We then calculated the level of the contributing factor that Latin America 
  14the region: only marginally below in terms of skills, marginally above in terms of physical capital and 
slightly below in terms of TFP. This finding suggests that the large drop of Latin America’s productivity 
between the 1960s and the 1990s was partly the result of an adjustment from relatively high levels of 
productivity in the 1960s that were atypical for the region’s income at that time. 
 
The current state of affairs in Latin America is not characterized by development imbalances: accumulated 
physical and human capital appear to match productivity at this stage of development. While in the 1960s 
there was an argument for unleashing development through faster accumulation to exploit high productivity, 
the current situation calls for a focus on productivity. 
 
Figure 7 
Level Accounting: Latin America relative to 
Developed Countries
































To gain perspective on the sizes of the gaps across the Latin American region, figure 8 shows level 
accounting exercises for each individual country during the 1990s decomposing the income gaps with respect 
to developed countries into its components by taking logarithms in equation (7) (we multiply all the values 
by minus one for presentation purposes). 
 
The figure provides useful information of the relative gaps in each country and identifies areas of deficit that 
might deserve policy attention. For example, a simple comparison between Mexico and Argentina in figure 8 
shows that both countries had roughly similar income gaps relative to the Developed countries in the 1990s. 
  15
                                                                                                                                                                  
should have had in each decade according to its level of development using the regression estimates and the observed income per 
worker for Latin America.   However, in Mexico the relative gaps in skills and in capital per worker were higher than in Argentina and 














































































Figure 9, 10 and 11 show the differences between the observed level of each contributing factor and the 
expected level on the basis of the level of development of each country (i.e. the deviation of each country 
from the norm). Returning to the example of Mexico and Argentina, the figures show that Mexico had levels 
of skills and capital per worker lower than expected, while Argentina had lower levels of total factor 
productivity. From a policy point of view, this kind of analysis provides a measure of the size of the 
shortfalls to address and a framework to establish priorities. We now turn into the question of what policies 
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Figure 9 
 






















Differences in Skill Levels after Adjusting for Development




























Differences in Capital/Labor Levels after Adjusting for Development
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Figure 11 






















Differences in TFP Levels after Adjusting for Development





IV. Explaining Productivity Growth  
We found that lower productivity is the main factor behind lower income in Latin America and that slow 
productivity growth is the main factor behind the slower growth of the typical Latin America country relative 
to the rest of the world and other relevant comparators. Therefore, we are interested in explaining what drives 
productivity. To this end, we study TFP growth through Barro-style regressions. We also run similar 
regressions on factor growth to sharpen the focus of the analysis and reconcile our results with the traditional 
growth regressions, which do not distinguish between factor growth and TFP growth components. In fact, in 
our estimations, growth effects can be obtained by adding the estimated effects on factor growth and those on 
TFP growth. 
 
The explanatory variables are divided in policies-related variables (variables affected by a wide range of 
public policies), institutions (quality of the institutions within which policies and economic decisions are 
carried out) and external factors (terms of trade shocks). The policies are proxied by the following variables: 
education (log of average years of secondary schooling in the male population over age 25); life expectancy 
  18(log of average years of life expectancy at birth); openness (structure-adjusted trade volume as % of GDP)
11; 
imports of machinery and equipment (log of machinery and equipment as % of GDP); credit to private sector 
(log of credit to private sector as % of GDP); government consumption (log of government expenditure as % 
of GDP)
12; inflation (log of inflation rate), and black market premium (log of 1 + black market premium). 
The institutions are proxied by the first principal component of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
variables, which combines risk of repudiation of contracts by government, risk of expropriation, corruption, 
rule of law and bureaucratic quality. The terms of trade shocks are measured by the growth rate of the terms 
of trade. The panel data consists on a sample of 73 countries and 6 five-year average subperiods from 1970-
74 to 1995-99. We also control for conditional convergence by including the initial per capita GDP and by 




Unfortunately, most of the variables that are used to construct the index of institutions are available starting 
from 1982, and for some countries, they are available only from 1985. Therefore, in order to use all our data, 
we construct the index of institutions for the subperiods that are not available using a predictive model based 
on the explanatory variables of the growth model. Here we follow the method used by Fernandez-Arias and 
Montiel (2001) to construct missing values of the structural reform index to explain GDP growth. Consider 
the following equation: 
 
(11)     it it it e M b a I + ⋅ + =
 
where   is the index of institutional quality, and   is a set of the explanatory variables included in the 
growth model (policy-related variables and the terms of trade shocks). Equation (11) is estimated using data 
for the subperiods 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-99. Then, with the estimated parameters of the model and 
data values of   for the subperiods 1970-74, 1975-79 and 1980-84, we estimate the missing values of 
.





                                                 
11 The idea of adjusted trade volume is taken from Pritchett (1996) and is measured as the residual of the following equation: 
(IMPORTS+EXPORTS)/GDP)i = a + b*log(POB)i + c*log(AREA)i + d*log(GDPPC)i + e*log(GDPPC)i*log(GDPPC)i + f* 
OIL_dummyi + g*LANDLOCK_dummyi + Ei . The measure indicates the amount by which a country's trade intensity exceed (or 
falls short) of that expected for a country with similar characteristics. 
12 It does not include expenditures for defense. 
13 Loayza et al (2002) consider the cyclical reversion to the long run trend in GDP per capita. In contrast, since our estimate of TFP 
reflects changes in the rates of factor utilization (as explained in Appendix B) which are the key of economic fluctuations, we control 
for the economic cycle in our three regressions by the cyclical reversion to the long run trend in TFP.  
14 Note that this procedure does not add any new information to the growth regressions but allows us to use the entire sample 
available. The estimation of equation (11) produces an R-square of 68 percent. 
  19Tables 6 and 7 provide a complete definition of all the variables as well as their descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the sample of 73 countries during the entire 1970-99 period. We control for potential 
endogeneity in all the regressions using instrumental variable (IV) estimation based on lagged values.   
 
We first run bilateral regressions for TFP growth as well as for GDP per capita growth and factor growth 
(shown in table 8) to explore the strength of the associations. For this exercise we estimate the impact of each 
of the explanatory variables individually while controlling, in all the cases, for conditional convergence and 
cyclical reversion. The results show that our proxies for education, life expectancy, openness, imports of 
machinery and equipment, credit to the private sector, institutions and growth rate of terms of trade, have all 
positive individual effects on TFP growth as well as on GDP per capita growth and factor growth (although 
the effects are not always significant). Inflation and black market premium, both proxies of policy 
mismanagement, have negative associations with the three variables. Government consumption, a variable 
that often appears with a negative sign in growth regressions, is normally taken as an indicator of the burden 
that government imposes on development if the public sector interferes with the market. Our regressions 
suggest that this negative effect on the growth rate of output is the result of crowding out effects on private 
activity, as the coefficient of government consumption is negative in the factor growth regression but not in 
the TFP growth regression. 
 
Another interesting result of these exploratory regressions is that the proxy for institutional quality has 
positive impacts on GDP per capita growth and TFP growth but not on factor growth. The result seem to 
suggest that if better institutions have positive effects on growth, these effects are likely to be channeled 
primarily through improved efficiency. We will come back to this point later.  
 
Table 8 shows that the coefficient estimates in the TFP regressions are often larger than those in the factor 
regressions. This implies that for equal changes in any explanatory variable, TFP growth is expected to be 
more sensitive than production factors growth (see table 9, which shows the ratio of the estimated coefficient 
in the TFP regression of table 8 relative to the estimated coefficient in the factor regression). Given these 
results, TFP growth is expected to have a larger response to any given change in the explanatory variables 
than factor growth (except for education, life expectancy and credit to private sector).  
 
Table 10 shows the results of multivariate regression analysis when all the explanatory variables are included 
at the same time. The estimated coefficients of the growth effects of the explanatory variables (first column) 
can be decomposed into effects on factor growth (second column) and on TFP growth (third column). In fact, 
our IV estimation framework yields an exact decomposition in which the first column can be obtained by 
simply adding the other two. Furthermore, table 10 allows us to trace unambiguously the statistical 
  20significance of growth effects to one or other channel (or both). Since we are primarily interested in 
analyzing what drives productivity, we first concentrate the explanation of the results in the TFP equation. 
Later we elaborate on the results of the other two equations to complement the analysis.  
 
Besides the conditional convergence and cyclical reversion control variables, which have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant in the TFP regression, the results concerning policy-related institutional 
variables show that the level of openness (structure-adjusted) and the quality of institutions have both 
positive effects on the growth rate of TFP and the inflation rate has a negative effect. 
 
Trade might affect growth through different channels. Trade might allow countries to specialize in those 
sectors of comparative advantages creating efficiency gains due to a better use of the factors of production. 
Trade might also allow firms to exploit sectors with economies of scale by expanding the size of the 
domestic market. Trade could also reduce anti-competitive practices of domestic firms and limit the 
incentives that firms might have to conduct rent-seeking activities. In our results, the effects of openness on 
growth are channeled primarily through TFP growth. Note that the coefficient for the openness variable is 
found to be positive also in the other two regressions but it is not significant in the factor growth regression. 
The result suggests that the primary vehicle of the impact of openness on economic growth is through 
increased dynamic efficiency. 
 
The inflation rate is a proxy for the quality of monetary and fiscal policy. High inflation rates signal an 
unstable macroeconomic environment that might hamper economic growth. Our results show that the 
mismanagement of macroeconomic policies appears associated with lower productivity growth which is 
detrimental to economic growth.  
 
The effects of the quality of institutions on development have received much attention in recent years. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show that institutions (proxied by mortality rate of colonial 
settlers) have a strong causal effect on income levels. Rodrik (2002) and Sachs (2003) found similar results 
using the same proxy. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) used the measure of rule of law from the ICRG 
variables and found that it has a positive and significant effect on the growth rate of output. None of these 
analyses, however, provide a clear indication of the channel by which institutions affect the level of income 
or the growth rate. In our analysis, the coefficient for institutional quality is shown to be positive in the TFP 
growth regression and also in the GDP per capita growth regression. Therefore, these results suggest that if 
better institutions have positive effects on the growth rate, the effects are likely to be channeled primarily 
through productivity growth. 
 
  21So far, our comments have been focused on the level of openness, the inflation rate and the quality of 
institutions because these were the variables that were shown to have a significant impact on TFP growth 
(our primary variable of interest). In what follows we complement the analysis by exploring the results from 
the other variables in the regressions. 
 
The coefficient for education is shown to be positive in all the regressions (although marginally significant, 
at the 15 percent level, only in the factor growth regression). The role of human capital on long-run growth 
has been stressed in the endogenous literature of economic growth. Human capital has a direct role as a 
factor of production and it is also important for innovation as well as for the absorption of foreign 
technology. Empirically, however, proxies for human capital have not always been robust in growth 
regressions. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), for example, use the average years in secondary and higher 
schooling for males aged 25 and over, albeit recognizing that not all types of educational attainment have a 
significant impact on economic growth. Running a set of alternative econometric growth models, Loayza, 
Fajnzylber and Calderón (2002) found that their proxy for human capital, the gross secondary-school 
enrollment, has a positive and significant impact on growth in about half of their regressions. Our results 
suggest that perhaps the main channel through which the level of human capital affects economic growth is 
through its direct impact on factor accumulation.  
 
The life expectancy variable is found to have positive and significant effects on the output growth regression 
and on the factor growth regression. Life expectancy is a proxy for good health and is normally found to 
have a strong positive relation with growth (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995 and De Gregorio and Lee, this 
volume). According to our results, this positive effect might arise through the factor accumulation channel. 
 
Besides our openness variable, which is a proxy for the general level of trade restrictions in the country, we 
model specifically the effect of imports of capital goods and equipment on economic growth. Imports of 
capital goods and equipment with superior technology can increase the efficiency of the production process 
and thus induce higher growth rates. In our results, however, this variable enters with a positive (although not 
significant) coefficient only in the factor growth regression which implies that there might be only a direct 
effect associated with the accumulation of foreign physical capital and not an indirect effect associated to the 
higher level of technology that is embodied in such goods. It is possible, however, that the efficiency of 
technologies from imported capital is captured already by our openness variable. Note that when the imports 
of capital goods variable enters only by itself, the coefficient is positive and significant in both the factor 
growth regression and the TFP growth regression. 
 
  22A good financial system facilitates risk diversification and channels resources to finance productive 
activities. Access to credit is key for the development of investment projects and, therefore, we should expect 
a positive association between financial depth and factor accumulation. Although we found a positive 
coefficient between our proxy of financial depth and the growth rate of factor accumulation, our results are 
not strong enough to confirm that this association is statistically significant.  
 
The results for government consumption are the same as when the variable enters the three regressions by 
itself. There is a negative effect on factor growth and on output growth and a positive (but not significant) 
effect on TFP growth. This implies that the negative effect on output growth is most likely the result of 
crowding out effects on private activity rather than of disruptions in productivity. 
 
Finally, similar to the inflation rate, the black market premium is used as a proxy for poor economic policy 
possibly in anticipation of crises. From our results, while the inflation rate appears to be associated with 
lower productivity, repressed exchange rates seem to be related with lower factor accumulation.  
 
How can we apply these findings to the case of failing TFP growth in Latin America? To answer this 
question we use the estimated equation of TFP growth in table 10 to determine the role of the explanatory 
variables in explaining the TFP growth gap of Latin America relative to the benchmarks, which was shown 
to be the key for its relative performance in growth per capita over the past forty years.
  
 
Figure 12 shows the contributions of the three variables that appear to have a statistically significant effect on 
TFP growth in the long-run (openness, inflation and institutions) to the gap in TFP growth between Latin 
America and the benchmarks during the 1970-99 period. According to the model, the relatively worse 
performance of Latin America with respect to all the other regions was the result of insufficient openness, 
macroeconomic mismanagement (proxied by the inflation rate) and worse institutions. When Latin America 
is compared with the rest of the world and the developed countries, the main factor was the worse 
institutional quality of the region. When the comparison is done with East Asia, however, the main factor 
was lack of openness. It is worth mentioning that the model is able to explain most of the observed gaps in 
TFP growth between Latin America and the comparators during the selected period. Specifically, the model 
(which includes openness, inflation, the quality of institutions, the convergence factor and the cyclical factor) 
explains 98% of the observed gap with respect to the rest of the world, 88% of the observed gap with respect 
to East Asia, and 74% of the observed gap with respect to the developed countries. 
  23Figure 12 










































































Contributions of Openness, Inflation and Institutions to annual TFP 




The above results are averages over the period 1970-99. However, how is the situation evolving over time?. 
In order to answer this question, we repeat the exercise shown in figure 12 but consider the two extreme sub-
periods: 1970-74 and 1995-99. Figure 13 shows the case. There is a shortfall in openness, macroeconomic 
mismanagement (inflation) and institutions with respect to all benchmarks in both subperiods. It is interesting 
to note, however, that the relative disadvantage arising from openness is more pronounced in the second 
period than in the first one (except when compared with the Developed countries). The relative disadvantage 
from macroeconomic management, however, is less pronounced in the second period with respect to all the 
regions, and the relative disadvantage from institutions is less pronounced in the second period (except when 
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Contribution of Openness, Inflation and Institutions to annual TFP growth with 




Overall, Latin American shortfalls have been reduced except with respect to the East Asian countries. It is 
important to note that behind these shortfalls in TFP growth there is a significant improvement in the 
variables that explain productivity in the region. In fact, according to our model, the average annual 
contribution of openness, inflation and institutions to TFP growth during the 1995-99 period was 1.13% 
higher than the average annual contribution of these variables during the 1970-95 period. This represents a 
significant improvement in the capacity (policy and institutional-based) of the region to generate TFP 
growth. Unfortunately, this improvement was not enough to eliminate Latin America’s productivity 
shortfalls with respect to the comparators. 
 
V. Final Remarks 
In this paper we have provided an overview of the growth experience of  Latin America during the last four 
decades. At first glance, the typical country in Latin America appears to have made good progress overall 
(increasing income per capita) but fallen into a low growth pattern during the 1990s, failing to regain the 
dynamism of the golden 1960s and 1970s. We find that this message is profoundly misleading. We argue that 
growth performance ought to be evaluated in relation to growth opportunities. When growth in Latin 
America is compared to relevant benchmarks derived from growth in the rest of the world, which controls for 
world technology shocks, we find that the typical country in Latin America has grown more slowly over the 
  25period and that the 1990s is actually the best decade. Countries in Latin America had sub-par growth in the 
1960s and 1970s; relative to that, growth in the 1990s was an improvement. 
 
The factor that stands out to explain these growth gaps with benchmarks is total factor productivity, as 
opposed to factor accumulation. Differences in growth rates of labor participation or the accumulation of 
capital (human in the form of labor skills and physical in the form of capital per worker) typically pale in 
comparison with the gap opened by lagging productivity improvements, or reversals, in the typical Latin 
American country. In turn, this productivity failure can be traced to distortions in the workings of the 
economy that drive aggregate efficiency below the technological frontier.    
 
The analysis of the gaps in income per capita between the typical Latin American country and the 
benchmarks also leads to a failure in total factor productivity. Relative to the typical developed country, 
income per capita declined from 37% in the 1960s to 24% in the 1990s. The main problem is not education: 
if labor skills were the only difference the typical country in the region would have Spain’s income (80%) 
and improving. Physical capital intensity is significantly sub-par but is broadly in line with the available 
returns to investment: better financial conditions may help but income per capita would at most increase to 
31%, not even enough to recover what was lost in the period. By contrast, closing the productivity gap would 
have a direct static effect on income and an indirect effect on investment due to higher returns that would 
bump income per capita at least to 59%, a level above Portugal or Greece.  
 
This policy focus on total factor productivity is further confirmed by contrasting the structure of production 
factors in Latin America with what could be expected under normal development. We find that the current 
structure of the aggregate production function in Latin America is normal, which we interpret as meaning 
that there is no anomalous relative shortfall in labor skills or physical capital that calls for policy priority. In 
fact, the collapse of productivity over time can be interpreted as an adjustment that eliminated excess 
productivity (relative to too little human and physical capital). While the policy priority in the 1960s could 
have been factor accumulation to exploit high productivity, right now policy attention ought to be directed to 
productivity. 
 
We find that the key policy instruments to address failures in total factor productivity are openness with the 
rest of the world, quality of macroeconomic policies, and the quality of institutions. Shortfalls in these 
aspects go a long way in explaining the opening gaps in productivity and, consequently, in overall growth.  
We find that macroeconomic stability and institutional gaps are gradually closing but the gap in openness is 
not, which suggests that an effort in accelerating economic integration is high priority.   
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Description Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Growth rate of GDP per capita 438 0.018 0.028 -0.083 0.124
Growth rate of TFP 438 0.001 0.022 -0.074 0.067
Growth rate of factors 438 0.017 0.014 -0.017 0.078
Initial GDP per capita (in logs) 438 8.177 0.962 6.152 9.854
Cyclical reversion in productivity: initial productivity gap relative to trend (in logs) 438 0.009 0.068 -0.217 0.242
Education: average years of sec and higher schooling in male pop with 25+ (in logs) 420 0.383 0.885 -3.101 1.895
Life expectancy at birth, years (in logs of [years/100]) 438 -0.440 0.173 -1.059 -0.220
Openness: structure-adjusted  426 0.029 0.388 -0.537 2.713
Inflation (in log of [1 + infla/100]) 429 0.185 0.406 0.003 3.543
Black market premium (in log of [1+bmp]) 438 0.152 0.374 -0.105 4.767
Credit to private sector / GDP (in logs) 426 -1.090 0.785 -3.953 0.712
Government consumption / GDP (in logs) 425 -1.965 0.381 -3.133 -0.950
Imports of machinery and equipment / GDP (in logs) 438 -3.092 0.657 -5.486 -0.468
Growth rate of terms of trade  410 0.000 0.041 -0.328 0.301
First principal components of ICRG variables 417 0.000 2.064 -4.133 3.075
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (1970-1999)
 
 
GRGDPPC GRA GFAC LGDPPC CYCLEA LSHYRM LLIFEE OPEN LINFLA LBMP LCREDIT LGOV ICRG GTOT LMACHIN
GRGDPPC 1
GRA 0.870 1
GFAC 0.608 0.137 1
LGDPPC 0.187 0.143 0.146 1
CYCLEA -0.054 -0.302 0.377 0.028 1
LSHYRM 0.161 0.160 0.065 0.804 -0.171 1
LLIFEE 0.246 0.148 0.255 0.856 -0.068 0.775 1
OPEN 0.213 0.159 0.173 0.006 -0.057 0.006 0.033 1
LINFLA -0.262 -0.220 -0.171 -0.117 -0.110 -0.069 -0.081 -0.183 1
LBMP -0.347 -0.269 -0.263 -0.272 -0.035 -0.210 -0.265 -0.126 0.420 1
LCREDIT 0.224 0.143 0.220 0.680 -0.002 0.582 0.643 0.228 -0.214 -0.411 1
LGOV -0.037 0.053 -0.160 0.387 0.022 0.255 0.229 0.014 -0.089 -0.052 0.289 1
ICRG 0.268 0.284 0.082 0.829 -0.069 0.745 0.700 0.169 -0.238 -0.376 0.662 0.490 1
GTOT 0.086 0.093 0.024 0.088 -0.063 0.078 0.132 0.024 -0.089 -0.095 0.104 0.004 0.133 1
LMACHIN 0.187 0.142 0.147 0.167 -0.058 0.147 0.182 0.703 -0.164 -0.118 0.220 0.248 0.301 0.093 1
Table 7: Correlations (1970-1999)
  29 
GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP
     Log of Initial Level -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0095 -0.0087 -0.0008 0.0053 0.0016 0.0037 0.0041 0.0011 0.0031 0.0001 -0.0014 0.0015
(1.33) (2.27)** (0.26) (3.96)** (7.88)** (0.41) (4.28)** (2.67)** (3.81)** (3.34)** (1.85)* (3.09)** (0.06) (1.58) (1.03)
     Cyclical Reversion -0.0578 0.0563 -0.1141 -0.0555 0.0582 -0.1137 -0.0671 0.0459 -0.1131 -0.0758 0.0438 -0.1196 -0.0600 0.0502 -0.1102
(2.78)** (5.45)** (7.16)** (2.80)** (6.36)** (7.25)** (3.36)** (4.73)** (7.23)** (3.92)** (4.57)** (7.89)** (2.93)** (5.17)** (6.89)**
Policies
     Education 0.0100 0.0054 0.0046
(3.87)** (4.22)** (2.30)**
     Life Expectancy 0.0968 0.0685 0.0283
(7.19)** (11.05)** (2.66)**
     Openness 0.0194 0.0091 0.0103
(6.08)** (5.86)** (4.14)**
     Imports of Machinery and Equipment 0.0083 0.0033 0.0049
(4.27)** (3.48)** (3.25)**
     Credit to Private Sector 0.0088 0.0053 0.0035
(3.60)** (4.59)** (1.83)*
Obs 420 420 420 438 438 438 423 423 423 438 438 438 419 419 419
R2 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.25
GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP GDPPC FACTOR TFP
     Log of Initial Level 0.0059 0.0025 0.0034 0.0042 0.0015 0.0027 0.0024 0.0004 0.0021 -0.0049 0.0004 -0.0053 0.0052 0.0016 0.0036
(4.16)** (3.71)** (3.08)** (3.27)** (2.34)** (2.69)** (1.75)* (0.54) (1.91)* (1.51) (0.26) (2.14)** (4.05)** (2.58)** (3.63)**
     Cyclical Reversion -0.0683 0.0457 -0.1139 -0.0734 0.0455 -0.1189 -0.0788 0.0425 -0.1213 -0.0516 0.0518 -0.1034 -0.0646 0.0455 -0.1101
(3.27)** (4.58)** (7.07)** (3.70)** (4.61)** (7.67)** (4.02)** (4.37)** (7.96)** (2.46)** (5.03)** (6.42)** (3.16)** (4.63)** (6.95)**
Policies
     Government Consumption -0.0065 -0.0075 0.0009
(1.66)* (3.99)** (0.31)
     Inflation -0.0149 -0.0015 -0.0134
(2.75)** (0.56) (3.16)**
     Black Market Premium -0.0263 -0.0114 -0.0149
(3.97)** (3.48)** (2.89)**
Institutions
     First Principal Components of ICRG 0.0060 0.0004 0.0056
(3.21)** (0.41) (3.93)**
External Factors
     Terms of Trade Shocks 0.0630 0.0217 0.0414
(1.84)* (1.32) (1.56)
Obs 418 418 418 416 416 416 438 438 438 367 367 367 416 416 416
R2 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.30 0.21 0.26
t-statistics in parentheses
Year controls not shown
** Significant at 5 percent level; * Significant at 10 percent level
Table 8: Individual Effects
 







     Education 0.852
     Life Expectancy 0.413
     Openness 1.132
     Imports of Machinery and Equipment 1.485
     Credit to Private Sector 0.660
     Government Consumption --
     Inflation 8.933
     Black Market Premium 1.307
Institutions
     First Principal Components of ICRG 14.000
External Factors
     Terms of Trade Shocks 1.908
Table 9: Sensitivity Effects*
*Calculated as the ratio of the estimated coefficient from the TFP 
regression over the estimated coefficient from the FACTOR 
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GDPPC FACTOR TFP
     Log of Initial GDPPC -0.0146 -0.0086 -0.0060
(3.49)** (4.45)** (1.77)*
     Cyclical Reversion -0.1077 0.0064 -0.1141
(2.47)** (6.75)** (6.89)**
Policies
     Education 0.0030 0.0022 0.0008
(0.94) (1.59) (0.31)
     Life Expectancy 0.0752 0.0557 0.0195
(4.51)** (7.23)** (1.44)
     Openness 0.0116 0.0038 0.0078
(2.21)** (1.55) (1.82)*
     Imports of Machinery and Equipment -0.0013 0.0014 -0.0027
(0.42) (1.03) (1.11)
     Credit to Private Sector -0.0016 0.0005 -0.0021
(0.57) (0.35) (0.90)
     Government Consumption -0.0080 -0.0082 0.0002
(1.64)* (3.45)** (0.05)
     Inflation -0.0117 -0.0004 -0.0113
(2.08)** (0.16) (2.47)**
     Black Market Premium -0.0138 -0.0086 -0.0052
(1.71)* (2.29)** (0.79)
Institutions
     First Principal Components of ICRG 0.0047 0.0007 0.0040
(1.82)* (0.57) (1.93)*
External Factors
     Terms of Trade Shocks 0.0006 -0.0109 0.0115
(0.02) (0.72) (0.43)
Obs 348 348 348
R2 0.35 0.43 0.35
t-statistics in parentheses
Year controls not shown
** Significant at 5 percent level; * Significant at 10 percent level









  32Appendix A : Groups of Countries and Data Sources 
 
Groups of Countries: 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 
Rest of the World: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Phillipines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Developed: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
East Asia: Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand. 
 
Data Sources: 
GDP     Penn  World  Tables  5.6,  Easterly  and Levine (2001), and World Dev. Indicators 
Capital     Penn  World  Tables  5.6, Easterly and Levine (2001), and World Dev. Indicators 
Labor force      World Development Indicators 
Years of education     Barro and Lee data base 
Life expectancy       World Development Indicators 
Openness     Authors  construction using WDI data 
Inflation     Global  Development  Finance and World Development Indicators 
Black Market Permium    Easterly and Levine (2001) 
Credit to private sector    World Development Indicators 
Government consumption    World Development Indicators 
Imports of machinery    UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
Terms of Trade      Global Development Finance and World Development Indicators 








  33Appendix B: Measures of TFP 
 
The labor and capital data employed in the growth accounting exercises of this paper refer to the 
inputs that are “available” in the marketplace rather than the inputs “effectively used” in the economy. 
In this Appendix we explain how this is consistent with a broad definition of total factor productivity. 
Consider the following production function: 
 
(1)     u u u u A L h K Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
−α α 1 ) (
 
where Ku and huLu are the capital and labor inputs effectively utilized in the production process and Au 
the corresponding observed productivity. Denoting the levels of available capital and labor inputs as K 
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to rewrite equation (1) as follows: 
 
(2)   u























In growth rates, equation (2) becomes: 
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From this expression, it can be seen that the growth rate of output depends on the growth rate of the 
available inputs and skills () ,() , , the growth rate of the utilization of these inputs and skills 
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  34The productivity variable in this specification is not affected by changes in factor utilization rates. This 
productivity variable only reflects changes in aggregate “technology” springing either from changes in 
efficiency at the micro level or from changes in the efficiency of the overall economic environment in 
which the production takes place. We like to think about efficiency, however, in a broader sense, 
taking into account the additional output that would be obtained if available inputs that are not 
channeled into the production process were utilized. We view idle input resources as a form of 
inefficiency and want to measure it accordingly. To achieve this, we want to measure total factor 
productivity relative to potential output under full utilization of inputs available in the marketplace. 
 
For example, consider two economies, A and B, with the same endowments and technology. Country 
A, however, exhibits a larger unemployment rate. We like to think country A as being less efficient 
than country B because it produces less with the same amount of available resources. Growth 
accounting exercises based on the amount of inputs used (rather than the amount of inputs available) 
will conclude that the productivity of both countries is the same, therefore, failing to capture this type 
of inefficiency. The productivity variable will only capture this inefficiency if the growth accounting 
exercises are based on the amount of inputs available. To see this, consider the following production 
function: 
(4)     A L h K Y ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
−α α 1 ) (
 
Here,  K and hL represent the levels of inputs of capital and labor “available” in the economy. 
Expressing equation (4) in growth terms and solving for the growth rate of productivity gives: 
(5)     () ( ) ( ) ( ) (
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
⋅ − − ⋅ − − ⋅ − = L h K Y A ) 1 ( ) 1 ( * α α α )
Finally, using equation (3) to substitute for   in this expressions gives:  ()
∧
Y
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Expression (6) shows that the growth rate of productivity  , depends on the growth rate of 
“technological” change ( , and the growth rates of factor utilization of capital () , 
labor , and skills ( . Therefore, for example, if an economy exhibits an increase in the 
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  35 
Understandably, there are changes in the utilization of inputs along the economic cycle. Economies 
tend to use more or less inputs depending on which phase of the cycle they are. Therefore, it would be 
misleading to judge an economy as less efficient just because it is in a lower part of the cycle. The 
issue of factor utilization becomes important only if there are differences in long-run trends. 
Consequently, in our growth accounting exercises we use 10-year averages to smooth out changes in 




Following equation (6), we used data on employment and labor force to measure the size of the 
contribution of the utilization of labor  , on the growth rate of productivity ( . We 
show that in general this contribution is rather small (see figure B.1). An immediate implication of the 
smallness of these contributions is that the results and conclusions of this paper, which is based on the 
analysis of decade averages, do not change qualitatively if we adjust for the rate of unemployment. 
(
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(contributions from labor utilization indicated by a dot) 